| Summary | The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials. A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges. |
|---|---|
| Publication Date | May 23, 2026, 4:17 a.m. |
| Registration Date | May 27, 2026, 4:06 a.m. |
| Last Update | May 23, 2026, 5:31 a.m. |
| CVSS3.1 : HIGH | |
| スコア | 8.8 |
|---|---|
| Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 攻撃元区分(AV) | ローカル |
| 攻撃条件の複雑さ(AC) | 低 |
| 攻撃に必要な特権レベル(PR) | 低 |
| 利用者の関与(UI) | 不要 |
| 影響の想定範囲(S) | 変更あり |
| 機密性への影響(C) | 高 |
| 完全性への影響(I) | 高 |
| 可用性への影響(A) | 高 |