In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dpaa2-switch: validate num_ifs to prevent out-of-bounds write

The driver obtains sw_attr.num_ifs from firmware via dpsw_get_attributes()
but never validates it against DPSW_MAX_IF (64). This value controls
iteration in dpaa2_switch_fdb_get_flood_cfg(), which writes port indices
into the fixed-size cfg->if_id[DPSW_MAX_IF] array. When firmware reports
num_ifs >= 64, the loop can write past the array bounds.

Add a bound check for num_ifs in dpaa2_switch_init().

dpaa2_switch_fdb_get_flood_cfg() appends the control interface (port
num_ifs) after all matched ports. When num_ifs == DPSW_MAX_IF and all
ports match the flood filter, the loop fills all 64 slots and the control
interface write overflows by one entry.

The check uses >= because num_ifs == DPSW_MAX_IF is also functionally
broken.

build_if_id_bitmap() silently drops any ID >= 64:
if (id[i] < DPSW_MAX_IF)
bmap[id[i] / 64] |= ...