In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

kcm: fix zero-frag skb in frag_list on partial sendmsg error

Syzkaller reported a warning in kcm_write_msgs() when processing a
message with a zero-fragment skb in the frag_list.

When kcm_sendmsg() fills MAX_SKB_FRAGS fragments in the current skb,
it allocates a new skb (tskb) and links it into the frag_list before
copying data. If the copy subsequently fails (e.g. -EFAULT from
user memory), tskb remains in the frag_list with zero fragments:

head skb (msg being assembled, NOT yet in sk_write_queue)
+-----------+
| frags[17] | (MAX_SKB_FRAGS, all filled with data)
| frag_list-+--> tskb
+-----------+ +----------+
| frags[0] | (empty! copy failed before filling)
+----------+

For SOCK_SEQPACKET with partial data already copied, the error path
saves this message via partial_message for later completion. For
SOCK_SEQPACKET, sock_write_iter() automatically sets MSG_EOR, so a
subsequent zero-length write(fd, NULL, 0) completes the message and
queues it to sk_write_queue. kcm_write_msgs() then walks the
frag_list and hits:

WARN_ON(!skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)

TCP has a similar pattern where skbs are enqueued before data copy
and cleaned up on failure via tcp_remove_empty_skb(). KCM was
missing the equivalent cleanup.

Fix this by tracking the predecessor skb (frag_prev) when allocating
a new frag_list entry. On error, if the tail skb has zero frags,
use frag_prev to unlink and free it in O(1) without walking the
singly-linked frag_list. frag_prev is safe to dereference because
the entire message chain is only held locally (or in kcm->seq_skb)
and is not added to sk_write_queue until MSG_EOR, so the send path
cannot free it underneath us.

Also change the WARN_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE to avoid flooding the log
if the condition is somehow hit repeatedly.

There are currently no KCM selftests in the kernel tree; a simple
reproducer is available at [1].

[1] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/a94d431c757e8d6f168f4dd1a3749daa